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1. Introduction 
The pattern of innovation in this country is constantly shifting.  The rise of the 
venture capital industry has lead to the emergence of startup firms founded to 
commercialize new technologies.1 The rise of startup innovation is, in turn, challenging 
the in-house R&D model which has dominated American industry since the turn of the 
century.2 As innovation moves outside the locus of large firms, a new market is 
emerging in the transfer of intellectual assets.  Two trends suggest that this market will 
continue to grow as an alternative to venture capital funded commercialization. 
First, there is a recognized breakdown in the effectiveness of in-house R&D in 
many industries. 3 The pharmaceutical pipeline is taking in increasingly larger sums of 
money and producing fewer and fewer drugs.4 Traditional R&D giants are looking to 
revitalize their internal efforts. Consequentially, firms are turning outside to find new 
ideas. 
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1 See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF INNOVATION: HOW VENTURE CAPITAL CREATES 
WEALTH 74-79 (2001). 
2 See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Intermediaries in the U.S. Market for Technology, 
1870-1920 (NBER Working Paper 9017, 2002). 
3 See Howard Anderson, Why Big Companies Can't Invent, MASS. INST. TECH. TECH. REV., May 2004, at 
56.  
4 See Stephen S. Hall, Revitalizing Drug Discovery, MASS. INST. TECH. TECH. REV., Oct. 2003, at 39. 
2Second, there are a growing number of entrepreneurs who have stepped in to fill 
this need.  There has been a growth of independent invention workshops, and in firms 
who actively search for inventors.5 Industries such as semiconductors are turning to 
"fabless" commercialization models.  Independent private laboratories and universities 
are successfully raising revenue through licensing.6 Commentators suggest that the true 
growth opportunity is not in idea generation, however, but in the role of intermediaries 
who are able to commercialize the abundant supply of new ideas.7
Venture capitalists are increasingly getting involved.  The new potential of the 
R&D licensing market, coupled with the slump in the IPO market, has increased the 
attractiveness of using technology transfer as an exit strategy.  Firms such as Cerian 
Technology Ventures have sprung up to asses and remarket the intellectual property of 
failed startup firms.8 The Venture Capital Journal has recently run several articles 
discussing the potential of mining portfolio companies' patent portfolios for value9.
The investment community has traditionally been weary of patent-based 
transactions.  The Harvard case study of Aberlyn Capital Management10, for example, 
highlights the risks of using patent-backed loans.  Often, unwary investors can end up 
stuck with a patent that is effectively worthless when the firm which created it failed.  For 
these transactions to gain acceptance, their risks and rewards must be better understood.  
 
5 See Evan I. Schwartz, Sparking the Fire of Invention, MASS. INST. TECH. TECH. REV., May 2004, at 32;  
Jena McGregor, The World is their R&D Lab, FAST COMPANY, May 2004, at 35. 
6 See Lawrence M. Fisher, The New Architecture of Biomedical Research 33 STRATEGY+BUSINESS 58 
(2003). 
7 See Kenan Sahin, Our Innovation Backlog, MASS. INST. TECH. TECH. REV, Jan. 2004, at 56. 
8 See Mike Allen, Ailing Firms' Prized IP is Up for Sale, San Diego Business Journal, Mar. 17, 2003, at 8.  
9 See Andrew J. Sherman & Paul Devinsky, Leveraging the Intellectual Capital of Your Portfolio 
Companies, VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL, Mar. 2003, at 1; Thomas D. Halket, To Do: Determine the Value 
of My Failed Startup's IP, VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL, Oct. 2002, at 1. 
10 Josh Lerner & Peter Tufano, Aberlyn Capital Management: July 1993 (Harvard Business School Case 
Study 9-294-083, 1997).  See also GOMPERS, supra note 1, at 36. 
3What is needed is a tool for valuing startup patents which incorporates the risks of 
technology transactions. 
 
2. The Need for a Patent Analysis  
This Paper attempts to fill that need by devising an analysis for valuing portfolio 
company patent rights.  The analysis is intended for investors seeking to utilize patents in 
firm valuations, as collateral for financing, or as an exit strategy.  The valuation of 
patents is a complicated and speculative task.  Much has already been written upon it.  It 
has been addressed in several divergent bodies of literature:  finance works valuing assets 
in the M&A context, legal works addressing infringement damages, and economic works 
valuing patents for use as data sources.  There is also a related body of industrial 
organization literature which addresses the effect of IP rights on startup firm 
commercialization.   
By focusing specifically on VC-funded startup firms' patents, this Paper takes 
advantage of several simplifying assumptions which will allow it to integrate the analyses 
of legal and industrial risks with standard valuation techniques. This analysis addresses 
some of the problems facing venture capital investors.   
This analysis reduces some of the uncertainty of investing in startup firms.  
Because it is based on publicly available information – patent searches, royalty rates, and 
the like - the valuation can be performed without any input from the entrepreneur at all.  
When inventors show up looking for funding with nothing other than an idea and a 
4business plan, the resale value of the idea should be as important as the projected value of 
their enterprise.  
By lowering the transaction costs of a licensing transaction, this analysis opens up 
the potential for out-licensing as an exit strategy.  These exits have the potential to 
mitigate the cyclic nature of the venture capital industry by offering investors the ability 
to exit their investment without having to wait for external business cycles to rebound.  
These exits also ameliorate some of the illiquidity issues with startup investment.  A 
startup firm increases the value of its patents during development by eliminating the 
technical risk associated with the underlying technology.  Out-licensing of unused 
technology, or of future interests in patent rights, can serve as a rapid means of selling off 
some of the value created by the startup firm prior to the outright sale of the firm. 
 
3. Approach 
A patent is worth nothing on its own.  It encompasses a right to make or sell an 
invention.  Any revenue which derives from the patent must come from sales of products 
containing the patented invention.   
When a startup firm gets a patent, it has two choices. First, it can make and sell 
the invention itself, using its patent monopoly to keep competitors out of the market 
while it acquires the resources needed to enter production.  Alternatively, it can sell its 
patent rights to another company which has the resources necessary to commercialize the 
invention in exchange for royalties on the final sales. 
There are, therefore, two potential measures of a patent's value.  The first is the 
amount of profits which the patent owner could realize through making and selling the 
5patented goods itself.  Computing this value is done by the Analytical Approach, which 
looks at the financial performance of manufacturers of similar products to determine 
benchmark profits.11 
Alternatively, a patent can be valued as the price which a company wishing to 
commercialize the invention would be willing to pay for a license.  This is the Relief from 
Royalty approach.12 
For an investor in a startup firm, the Relief from Royalty approach is the most 
helpful because it best approximates the resale value of the patent.  It is comparable to a 
piece of production equipment.  An investor who is valuing the asset as collateral is more 
interested in the equipment's value on the market than in the future profits derived from 
the goods it produces.  Profits from sales of patented goods are dependent on the business 
which will commercialize the patent, whereas future royalty streams represent the value 
which any owner of the patent can receive. 
Three types of approaches are generally used to estimate future royalty streams.  
Just like startup firms, patents can be valued using Cost, Market-Comparables, and 
Income.13 
11 See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 224-27 (3rd ed. 2000). 
12 See id. at 222-24. 
13 See generally Robert B. Lamb, The Role of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Lanning Byer & 
Melvin Simensky, eds.); Michael J. Lasinski, Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Lanning Byer & 
Melvin Simensky, eds.); RICHARD RAZGAITIS, VALUATION AND PRICING OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 119 (2003); Jeffery H. Matsuura, An Overview of Intellectual Property and 
Intangible Asset Valuation Methods, 14 RES. MGMT. REV. (2004); Jonathan A. Barney, A Study of Patent 
Mortality Rates: Using Statistical Survival Analysis to Rate and Value Patent Assets, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 317 
(2002); Markus Reitzig, Improving Patent Valuation Methods for Management (Copenhagen Business 
School LEFIC Working Paper 2002-09); Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents (Judge Institute 
Working Paper WP 21/97). 
6The most rudimentary approach is to use historical costs such as the R&D and 
regulatory investment in acquiring the patent right.14 Because the sunk costs in a patent 
bear almost no relation to the potential revenues from an invention, however, this method 
does not accurately reflect the potential resale price. 
A market-based approach looks to similar transactions as a source of the expected 
future value.  In theory, this approach has great appeal to predicting licensing revenue 
because it is based on comparison of previous licensing deals.  Furthermore, the legal 
standard of the reasonable royalty is based in part on the prevailing market rate for 
technology. 
However, several practical problems with this approach are often cited as its 
downfall.  First, it is by definition impossible to identify a truly comparable market 
transaction.15 Patents are by statutory definition unique goods.  Therefore, there will 
always be differences between other traded technologies and the one at issue.  
Furthermore, the dynamic of the technology transaction can vary significantly from 
transaction to transaction.16 
The second significant shortcoming in the market-based approach is the scarcity 
of information on technology transactions.17 The terms of these transactions are 
generally not made available to the public.  Even when deals are announced, key pricing 
terms are often omitted.   
 
14 See Barney, supra note 13, at 323-24. 
15 See Pitkethly, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
16 See Matsuura, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
17 See Barney, supra note 13, at 322-33. 
7This difficulty, however, mimics the general informational scarcity in the venture 
capital industry.  In fact, there is much more information available on patent transactions 
than for many other aspects of the venture capital industry.  By focusing on licensing to 
established companies, this analysis generally focuses on interactions with publicly held 
firms.  At least some firms consider licensing transactions sufficiently material to 
disclose them.  Furthermore, patent disputes do sometimes end up in the courts, where 
the terms of litigated royalty rates are public knowledge. 
The use of market-comparables can be enhanced through the use of value 
characteristics.18 Value characteristics are used in the valuation of private companies to 
serve as the basis for comparison with companies for whom valuation data is available. 
An ideal value characteristic is easily quantifiable and serves as a good proxy for firm 
value. 
The most popular patent valuation method is the income approach.  This approach 
values the patent as the present value of future earnings.19 The future income streams 
from a patent are computed using either a discounted cash flow ("DCF") or real options 
approach.20 The DCF approach looks at the income stream derived over the life of the 
patent, and adjusts for the risks involved in income production.  The real options 
approach considers the technology as an option which the owner may exercise if and 
when the costs of implementation are outweighed by the benefits of patent use.   
The DCF method is best suited for this application.  Royalty streams are easily 
valued as a series of annual payments.  Furthermore, the technique is well-suited to 
 
18 See John Willinge, A Note on Valuation in Private Equity Settings, in VENTURE CAPITAL & PRIVATE 
EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 197, 197-99 (Josh Lerner & Felda Hardymon, eds., 2002). 
19 See Pitkethly, supra note 13, at 8-17. 
20 See id. 
8capture the effect of the duration and risks of the transaction.  Because of the compound 
assessments of risk in this calculation, a potential future expansion would be to use some 
form of Monte Carlo simulation. 
Patent valuation techniques have been applied to a wide variety of situations, 
from M&A valuation to infringement royalties.  The choice of technique is governed by 
the context of the valuation.  This Paper performs the valuation in the eyes of a venture 
capitalist or other investor who has secured the rights in a patent from an entrepreneur in 
exchange for financing.  This Paper assumes that the entrepreneur has failed to turn a 
sufficient profit, and that the investor chooses to cease commercialization of the 
invention and instead raise revenue through licensing.     
This Paper will first calculate future royalties through using market-comparables.  
The Paper defines a series of value characteristics which to be used in comparing 
comparable transactions.  Once royalty streams are calculated, the Paper will find their 
net present value, capturing the risks of the licensing transaction in the discount rate. 
A number of factors affect the success of patent licensing.  They can be 
categorized as Legal, Technical, and Industrial.  Legal risks stem from the quality of the 
patent itself and the nature of the relief which the courts will grant.  Technical risks 
reflect the quality and value of the underlying technology.  Industrial risks characterize 
the difficulties of finding a buyer for the licensed technology, and look at the 
organization of firms within the industry.   
Each of these risks will be explored below.  For each area, risks are identified for 
use in determining the discount rate and value characteristics are defined for use in 
comparable analysis. 
94. Litigation Damages and Patent Quality 
A patent is nothing more than a set of legal rights. In order to understand the 
value of a patent, one must first understand exactly what those rights entitle one to do.  
The patent grant conveys nothing other than the right to "exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States"21 It does 
not convey any positive right to practice the invention itself. Therefore, the ultimate basis 
for the value of a patent is the legal damage award that one can receive from an infringer. 
A potential licensee should be willing to pay no more for a license he stands to 
lose in a patent lawsuit.  That is sum of the probability-discounted infringement damages 
and the cost of litigation: 
( ) COSTLITIGATIONDAMAGESRISKLITIGATIONROYALTY +•
Damages 
A patent owner is entitled to both monetary and injunctive relief.  Monetary relief 
compensates the patent owner for past infringement, and injunctive relief will prevent 
future infringement.  The statutory provision for monetary damages grants "damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer."22 In practice, this translates 
into damages for Lost Profits and a Reasonable Royalty. It is noteworthy that, with the 
 
21 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §154 (2003). 
22 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §284 (2003). 
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exception of design patents, the patent owner is not entitled to disgorge the profits that 
the infringer has earned. 
Lost profits compensate for economic damages that the patent owner experienced 
due to unlawful competition.  In the licensing context, however, the patent owner is not 
engaged in an enterprise which utilizes the patent.  Consequentially, the owner has no 
profits to have lost, and is only eligible to receive a reasonable royalty.  Methods for 
determining the royalty rate and base will be developed below. 
In addition to monetary compensation for past infringement, the patent owner can 
often get an injunction prohibiting the infringer from continuing to manufacture.  
Injunctions are offered at the court's discretion.  There is a considerable risk that a patent 
owner engaged in royalty generation will not be viewed as a sympathetic candidate for an 
injunction against infringers.  The Federal Circuit has denied a preliminary injunction in a 
case where a non-manufacturing owner was attempting to generate royalty revenue.23 
The court stated in particular that "the lack of commercial activity is a significant factor" 
in assessing the need for an injunction, and that evidence that the patentee offered a 
license to the infringer prior to litigation was clear evidence that it was "willing to forgo 
its patent rights for compensation."24 Furthermore, a district court has recently upheld the 
denial of a permanent injunction as a damage award in a similar case.25 The court gave 
particular notice to the inventor's expressed desire to "[S]ell off our Intellectual Property 
rights."26 
23 See High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Ind., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
24 See id. at 1556-57. 
25 See Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 695 (E.D.Va 2003). 
26 See id., note 13. 
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Because of the unlikelihood of receiving a permanent injunction, and the lack of 
lost profits, damages can simply be computed as the product of the royalty rate and 
royalty base summed for each potential licensee: 
BASEROYALTYRATEROYALTYDAMAGES •=
Royalty Rate 
The calculation of reasonable royalties is the subject of much litigation.  The 
courts generally apply the standard of "the hypothetical negotiations between willing 
licensor and willing licensee."27 Such a negotiation is presumed to be an arms-length 
negotiation between parties who have not yet resorted to litigation.28 The reasonable 
royalty is, as defined, basically the market rate for the technology license. 29 
Litigation Costs 
The excessive expense of patent litigation has a large effect on parties' license 
valuation.  The cost of litigating a patent case has been estimated to be from $1 Million 
for small cases to up to $3 Million for large cases.30 Economic losses due to a 
 
27 Fromsom v. Western Litho Plate & Supp. Co, 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also State Indus., Inc. 
v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 833 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
28 See id. 
29 There is an obvious circularity in that the negotiated royalty prior to litigation will be discounted to 
reflect the uncertainties of litigation.  The courts are not blind to this, and have occasionally increased 
royalty damages so as provide an incentive for infringers to avoid litigation, though not always without 
controversy.  See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir 1978) 
("The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the equivalent of ordinary 
royalty negotiations among truly 'willing' patent owners and licensees. . . . [T]he infringer would have 
nothing to lose and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-
infringers might have paid."); See also  Stephen H. Kalos &  Jonathan D. Putnam, On the Incomparability 
of 'Comparables': An Economic Interpretation of 'Infringer's Royalties' 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2 (1997). 
30 Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin,  Benefits and Costs of an Opposition Process, in PATENTS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, at 120 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merill, eds., 2003). 
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preliminary injunction are not likely to be an issue, because, as discussed above, the court 
will likely not grant such an injunction.31 
Litigation Outcome 
The final component of this analysis is the projected litigation outcome.  This 
analysis will use the historical probability of plaintiff victory to predict infringer 
behavior.  This ignores, for the sake of simplicity, the potential effects of differing 
expectations on the outcome of litigation.    
Empirical studies put the probability of patentee victory, taken at the time a 
compliant is filed, at nominally 50%.32 This serves as the starting point in predicting 
litigation outcomes.  However, refinement can be had by further unpacking the litigation 
process.  A patent trial first adjudicates the validity of the patent, and then determines if 
infringement has occurred.  In order to be granted a patent, the patentee must persuade 
the patent office that his application meets certain legal standards.  The patent office's 
determination of validity, although presumed to be correct, can be challenged during the 
litigation process.  If a patent is found invalid at trial, then it can generally not be 
enforced again.  Conversely, a trial court's finding of validity, though not binding in 
future cases, is a good indication of the patent's validity.   
Therefore, the outcome of any previous litigation for a patent can have a 
significant impact on its value.33 If a patent has been previously found invalid, the 
 
31 But see Jean O. Lanjow & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table?  The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 64 J. L. & 
ECON. 573 (2001). 
32 See id.
33 See Edward F. Sherry R David J. Teece, Royalties, Evolving Patent Rights, and the Value of Innovation,
33 RES. POL'Y 179 (2004). 
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chance of winning is effectively zero.  If it has been found valid and infringed, its 
chances of future litigation success are greatly increased. 
If the patent has not been subject to prior litigation, there are several legal risks 
that can still be identified.  The liberal granting of patents by the PTO has sometimes put 
it ahead of the courts in offering protection to rapidly advancing technologies.  For 
example, patents granted on modified living organisms were not upheld until the 
landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty34, and business methods were not patentable 
until State Street Bank35. Furthermore, the cursory examination given by the government 
during the application process often fails to find anticipating prior art which might be 
uncovered during litigation.  Other issues, such as the potential risk of the first-inventor 
defense for business methods, will also need to be analyzed and catalogued.   
 
5. Patent Scope 
The previous section addressed the potential size of damages which a patent 
holder might recover from an infringer.  In this section, the number of potential infringers 
against which a legally sound claim exists is evaluated.  A patent is, ultimately, nothing 
more than a legal document which describes and claims a piece of technology space for 
the owner. Therefore, two patents on comparable subject matters may be written in such a 
manner as to claim vastly different sizes of the technology space.  Furthermore, the courts 
may interpret two facially similar patents very differently in light of other legal doctrines 
 
34 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
35 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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and policies.  Consequentially, the scope of the patent document itself dictates the size of 
the patent's market for licensees.   
The most fundamental conception of the scope of a patent grant is the actual size 
of the claimed technology space.  Drawing a parallel to real property, the value of a 
patent is directly related to its size in the same manner as the value of a piece of land is 
related to its acreage.  There are several reasons why a large patent is more valuable than 
a small one.  First, a large patent may cover multiple technologies.  The purchaser of a 
license would be enabled to commercialize several inventions.  Because exclusive 
licenses can be granted for specific applications of a patent, several exclusive licenses can 
be carved out of a broad patent.  Furthermore, a broader patent is more difficult to invent 
around. 
Subjective Approach: Identifying Applications and the Royalty Base  
A three-step process can be used to measure the ultimate scope and reach of a 
patent.  First, the claimed technology is identified, and any limitations in the claims are 
noted.  This gives the overall claimed technology space.  Next, the fields of use which 
intersect with the claimed space must be identified.  Finally, the scope of the royalty base 
is determined, in light of the Entire Market Value Rule. 
A patent applicant will claim as much of the technology space as is possible 
without stepping on the bounds of previous patents.  To avoid previous patents, the 
applicant will add limitations restricting what he claims.  Because the claims are verbal 
descriptions of complex technologies, they must be interpreted to ascertain what they 
cover. 
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During litigation, the court construes the exact scope of a patent's claims.36 When 
a patent has not been litigated, the most effective approach is to assemble a panel of 
experts, comprising patent attorneys, managers, and scientists, to read the document and 
reflect upon the content of its claims.37 
A patent can reach beyond its literal scope through the doctrine of equivalents.  
The doctrine essentially states that a defendant will be found to be infringing if his 
technology is an "equivalent" of the patented technology.  This extension is broadest 
when patents are written in new and open fields, but can be limited by procedural 
complications during the application process.38 Therefore, a legal analysis should also 
include an analysis of the patent's prosecution history. 
Any product which contains all of the elements in a patent claim will infringe.  
Therefore, once the scope of the claims is established, all potential infringing uses should 
be listed.  For example, a patent covering LCD technology may have applications in the 
PDA field, the computer monitor field, and the aeronautical instrument field. Of these, 
the most lucrative should be retained for further analysis. 
Finally, the scope of the royalty base should be determined under the Entire 
Market Value Rule39. The rule dictates what sales can be included in a royalty base for 
damages.  Final product sales are included in the royalty base, so long as (1) the patented 
component works as an integral component of the final product, and (2) the benefits of 
the patented feature drive customer demand for the final product.  For example, a 
 
36 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
37 See Joshua Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: an Empirical Analysis, 25 RAND J. ECON. 319, 320 
(1994). 
38 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
39 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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patented LCD display licensed for use in car stereos would have a claim on stereo sales, 
but probably not the final price of every car sold with the units.  
Statistical Approaches 
Given the cost of the qualitative approach, and its limitations when considering 
large numbers of patents, there have been numerous attempts to correlate quantifiable 
patent data with the size of the protected technology.  These statistical approaches are 
useful for comparing the relative scope of patents in comparable transactions. 
Research suggests that claim breadth is correlated with the Patent Office's 
assignment of field codes.40 When a patent application is considered by the government, 
it is assigned a classification to a particular technology area.  If a patent covers a broad 
area of technology it might be assigned to several classifications. Empirical analysis has 
shown that when a patent is assigned to multiple categories it is likely to be more 
economically valuable, and, consequentially, to have a greater scope. 
Citation data can also be used as a measure of claim scope.  When a patent 
applicant comes across a piece of prior art, such as a scientific publication or another 
patent, which is closely related to the idea he is patenting, he must include a citation to it 
in his application, and explain to the examiner why his invention is not anticipated by it.  
The number of these citations made outside of the patent's class has been developed as 
another measure of the breadth of the patent claims.  The measure, termed "Originality" 
 
40 See Lerner, supra note 32. 
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measures the number of citations made out of the patent's class, and the number of 
classes cited.:41 
	= nj jsYORIGINALIT 21
Where n is the total number of patent classes that the patent cites, and s is the 
proportion of those citations the patent makes in a given class j.
Statistics regarding prosecution history have also been applied to ascertain claim 
value.42 These measure things like the seniority of the patent examiner, or the time spent 
on the patent application.  However, these statistics primarily report on the patent agent's 
assessment of the patent's value as reflected in his allocation of time and energy to the 
prosecution process.  Like renewal data analysis,43 these statistics serve more as an ex-
post proxy for the patent-owner's assessment of value than as a tool which can help the 
patent owner assess the strength of his legal entitlement. 
 
6. Technology Quality and Importance 
Assuming that the patent affords adequate protection, the next determinant of 
patent value is the value of the underlying technology which it represents.  While the 
quality of an innovation is a qualitative notion, some metrics do exist which can afford a 
framework for analysis.  The most ready framework is the measure of technical risk 
 
41 See Browyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent Citations Data File:  
Lessons, Insights, and Methodological Tools, at 21 (NBER Working Paper 8498, 2001). 
42 See Ian Cockburn, Samuel Kortum, Scott Stern, Are All Patent Examiners Equal?  Examiners, Patent 
Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 120 (Welsey 
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merill, eds., 2003). 
43 See Jean O. Lanjow et al., How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: the Uses of Patent 
Renewal and Application Data, 46 J. IND. ECON. 405 (1998). 
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employed in an industry.  The quality of an invention can also be measured using patent 
statistics. 
Technical Risk 
Every R&D project is an exercise in overcoming technical risk of failure.  
Although an innovation must be "reduced to practice" and be "useful" before the Patent 
Office grants a patent, it does not necessarily follow that the commercially viable 
embodiment of the invention will work.  Many industries have a series of milestones by 
which to quantify the risk that an invention will fail.  For example, the pharmaceutical 
industry has a regimented series of milestones through which a drug application must 
pass.  Factory equipment, similarly, goes from process definition through design, to pilot 
tests, and finally to full-scale rollout. 
Technical risk is just as important in licensing as it is in commercialization 
because royalties are based upon licensee sales.  It will ultimately be factored into the 
overall discount rate for the royalty stream.  Venture capitalists will demand rates of 
return as high as 50% for technologies which have not been reduced to prototype, and 
30% for technologies ready for commercial rollout.44 
There is a considerable variation of risk from industry to industry.  A software 
patent, for example, is almost guaranteed to work, while a pharmaceutical patent has a 
long series of tests to undergo before entering the market. 
Patent Statistics 
 
44 See SMITH, supra note 11, at 556. 
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Patents that represent better ideas should be more valuable.  Drawing from the 
requirements for patentability, an invention which is exceedingly non-obvious or useful 
has a greater potential to be a breakthrough idea.  The most reliable means of measuring 
such inventive novelty is, as discussed above, to perform a qualitative assessment of the 
patent document.  There is also a potential to make use of the citations developed during 
patent prosecution as value characteristics. 
As developed above, patent citations indicate closely linked technologies.  A 
patent which has been cited many times is, therefore, relevant to many subsequent 
inventions.  Not only does this indicate that it would have a broader scope, but it also 
indicates that others have felt it beneficial to continue along its line of research. 
Patent citation counts can be generated in many of the available on-line databases.  
There have been numerous refinements upon basic counts.  A weighted count can be 
performed, where the value of each citation received is in turn weighted by the number of 
citations that that patent receives.45 A generality index can be calculated, like the 
originality index, by measuring the proportion of citations received which fall outside the 
patent's field.46 A final measure is the proportion of scientific papers to which the patent 
cites, with the theory being that more fundamental technologies are more innovative.47 
7. Technology Market Concerns 
 
45 See Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 
RAND J. ECON. 172, 174-75 (1990). 
46 See Hall et al., supra note 41, at 22. 
47 See id. 
20
The previous sections have addressed metrics for measuring the quality of a 
patent itself.  However, the key determinant of the value of a patent is, ultimately, the 
price it commands on the market. This section addresses measures of the size of the 
market for a particular patent license. 
It is assumed that the patent owner has been unable to achieve success 
commercializing the patent in a startup firm, and has resorted to raising royalties through 
licensing.  It is further assumed that the potential customers for such licenses are 
established firms in the relevant industry.  Given the current amount of venture capital 
funding which is available, as well as the propensity of venture capitalists to actively 
assist promising investments with financial and management resources, it is assumed that 
the failure of a startup firm is due to the ineffectiveness of the startup mode of 
commercialization, and that there would be no benefit in licensing the technology to 
another startup firm. 
The Technology Market 
The probability of finding a licensee is much higher if there is a healthy market 
for the licensed technology.  A large body of literature exists which describes the factors 
which give rise to such a market, and its effect on the commercialization strategy of 
startup firms.48 For the purposes of valuation, it is assumed that of two patents of 
 
48 See generally David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986);  David J. Teece, Competition, 
Cooperation, and Innovation:  Organizational Arrangements for Regimes of Rapid Technological 
Progress, 19 J ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1992); James J. Anton, & Dennis A. Yao, The Sale of Ideas: 
Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting, 69 REV. ECON. STUD. 513 (2002);  Gary P. Pisano, 
The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative Arrangements in the Biotechnology 
Industry, 20 RES. POL'Y 237 (1991);  David J. Teece & Henry W. Chesbrough, When is Virtual Virtuous?: 
Organizing for Innovation, in MANAGING HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES (Harvard Business School Press, 1999); 
Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, The Product Market and the Market for 'Ideas': Commercialization 
Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL'Y 333 (2003); Atul Nerkar & Scott Shane, When Do 
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comparable scope and quality, the one for which a larger and more efficient market exists 
will be able to generate more income for its owner.49 Using the framework derived by 
Gans and Stern50, this analysis focuses on the effectiveness of patents as a means of 
appropriability and the distribution of complimentary assets. 
Excludability Effectiveness of Patents 
The actual preclusive effect of a patent varies considerably with the nature of the 
technology in which it is used.  For example, a patent on a chemical compound may be 
sufficient to prevent an infringer from practicing a technology, whereas a patent on a 
mechanical product may be designed around with considerable ease.  Patents which 
cannot effectively block commercialization by others, even if enforced, are of little value. 
Several factors affect the value of patents to prevent appropriation.51 First, 
infringement must be detectable. Technologies whose use would be hard to detect in a 
finished product would, therefore, be difficult to enforce.  Furthermore, the patent must 
be difficult to invent around.52 Pharmaceutical patents are, for example, particularly 
valuable because of the fact that a described chemical embodiment often has properties 
which cannot be replicated by similar compounds.  Patents are more effective when their 
 
Start-Ups that Exploit Patented Academic Knowledge Survive?, 21 J. IND. ORG. 1391 (2003), Ashish 
Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for Technology and their Implications for 
Corporate Strategy, 10 IND. & CORP. CHANGE 419 (2001); Charles W. Hill, Strategies for Exploiting 
Technological Innovations: When and When not to License, 3 ORG. SCI. 428 (1992); Joshua S. Gans, David 
Hsu & Scott Stern, When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction? (NBER 
Working Paper 7851, 2000. 
49 See Timothy F. Biesnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg, General Purpose Technologies: 'Engines of Growth'?,
35 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (1995).  See also Arora et al., Markets for Technology, supra note 48, at 427. 
50 See Gans & Stern, supra note 48. 
51 See generally Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropriation, 30 
RESEARCH POL'Y 611 (2001); Welsey M. Cohen et al., Protecting their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability 
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (NBER Working Paper 7552, 2000). 
52 See Hill, supra note 48, at 431. 
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enforcement is less costly than other means of protection, such as secrecy and lead time.53 
Finally, patents are more effective if the technology is such that the knowledge needed to 
execute is can be codified, or easily memorialized and transferred, as opposed to 
industries where most of the know-how necessary to commercialize a product is tacit, and 
cannot be controlled through patent enforcement.54 
The overall effectiveness of patents varies from industry to industry.  Although an 
analysis of the aforementioned factors can be performed for any industry, this effort can 
be avoided by turning to empirical research.  Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh55 performed a 
survey of executives to determine the relative effectiveness of patents in various 
industries.  They have found, for example, that pharmaceutical and medical patents are 
effective while software patents are not. 
Complimentary Assets 
The distribution of complimentary assets in an industry can have significant 
impact on the ability of a patent owner to profitably out-license.  Complimentary assets 
are the technologies and organizations which are necessary to bring the patented 
technology into commercial existence.  One of the key benefits of licensing a technology 
is to capitalize on the profits of a firm which is better suited to take advantage of the 
technology than the inventor. 
 
53 See Arundel, supra note 51. 
54 See Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 46, at 287.  The Enablement 
Requirement, 35 U.S.C. §112 mandates that a patent be sufficiently detailed to facilitate the practice of the 
underlying technology, so, in theory, all patents should perfectly codify the necessary knowledge.  
However, enablement is evaluated in light of an individual having ordinary skill in the art, and it is that, 
tacit, skill which determines if an invention can be practiced.  Consequently, Teece's argument could be 
recast to state that patents are more effective when the novel claim is more scarce than the ordinary skill 
needed to practice it. 
55 See Cohen et al., supra note 48.  
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There are several types of complimentary assets required to commercialize an 
invention.56 Complimentary technologies are the downstream technologies directly 
needed to bring an innovation to market.  These include manufacturing, distribution, and 
marketing.  Prior technologies include existing product platforms in which the innovation 
must operate.  For example, an improvement in LCD technology must interface with 
existing computer monitor technology in order to be sold.  Finally, enabling technologies 
are convergent technologies which might be integrated with the innovation in future 
product applications.  Small LCD displays capable of replacing CRT's had to be 
integrated with microprocessor and software innovations in order to create the PDA 
market.  For profits to be realized, these assets must all be brought together, along with 
the license, within the boundaries of the same firm.   
A technology can be either specific or general with regard to these complimentary 
assets.57 A general technology can be commercialized through many different pathways, 
thus creating many potential downstream licensees.  A more specialized technology, on 
the other hand, will have fewer licensees to choose from.  Consequently, a broad patent 
which covers many different applications can be commercialized by more firms, and 
should, therefore, be easier to market. 
The complimentary assets may be specialized or generic with regard to their 
applications.58 Specialized complimentary assets are only able to commercialize a small 
number of applications, whereas generalized complimentary assets can be adapted to 
many uses.  Retail distribution networks are general with regard to what they can 
 
56 See Teece, Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation, supra note 48, at 13. 
57 See Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation, supra note 48. 
58 See id. 
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distribute, as opposed to high-throughput drug-screening equipment whose use is limited 
to pharmaceuticals.   
Complimentary asset distribution drives the market for patent licenses.  The 
market is strongest when there are a large number of firms with complimentary assets, 
and when those assets are specialized with regard to what they can be used to produce.  
When there are a relatively small number of firms situated to commercialize an 
innovation, the strength of the patentee’s monopoly is diminished by the low supply of 
partners. Likewise, when the complimentary assets are specialized, manufacturers are 
less able to work around the patentee’s monopoly by producing different goods.   
Industry concentration is another factor which drives price.59 In concentrated 
industries, a small number of firms hold a large percentage of the assets.  Firms in a 
fragmented industry are more prone to be under competitive pressures, and are more 
likely to adopt external technologies to secure a competitive advantage.  Firms in 
concentrated industries are larger and more established, and are under less pressure to 
turn outside for help.   
Adverse Selection 
It is important to realize that the factors which affect the ability to find a licensee 
also often affect the success of a startup firm.  In fact, factors such as the presence of a 
large number of firms with the necessary complimentary assets to develop a technology 
work against the startup firm.  Likewise, startup firm failure is more likely in 
concentrated industries, when the firm must compete with entrenched incumbents for 
market share.  Consequentially, these situations mitigate some of the adverse selection 
 
59 See Gans & Stern, supra note 48. 
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risk of purchasing a technology which could not be commercialized by its inventor.  In 
some situations, there is more risk that a firm which has failed has done so because of 
competitive pressures, as opposed to the inadequacy of its technology. 
 
8. Technology Pull 
Even if a potential market for a technology exists, the price commanded by the 
licensor is dependant upon demand.  Many established firms shy away from the external 
acquisition of technology. The "not invented here" syndrome is probably the biggest 
impediment to a successful licensing operation.  The literature suggests several 
conditions when firms look to external innovations in lieu of internal R&D.60 These 
situations are often transient, and external technology sourcing is often not a viable long-
term business model.61 However, when these situations arise, the value of a licensed 
technology can rapidly increase. 
External sourcing is driven by high competitive intensity.  In new product spaces 
in particular, the race for the first-mover advantage can put development time at a 
premium.  Off-the-shelf innovations, while perhaps less desirable than internally 
designed products, can be implemented much more quickly.  Furthermore, cost pressures 
in some industries do not support active in-house R&D.  In such situations, firms seeking 
innovative expansion must look outside to fill their needs.   
 
60 See Scott K. Swan and Brent B. Allred, A Product and Process Model of the Technology-Sourcing 
Decision, 20 J. PROD. INNOV. MGMT. 485 (2003); Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 48. 
61 Id. at 486. 
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Firms resort to external sourcing in the face of dynamic product changes because 
their core R&D efforts cannot keep pace with external technical advances.  In such 
situations, external sourcing serves as a stopgap to fill the product pipeline until internal 
R&D assets can be retooled to react to the new technology trends.   
External sourcing is reemerging in light of the perceived failure of in-house R&D 
to generate radical breakthroughs.62 The pharmaceutical industry, for example, is 
cultivating external relationships in light of the inability of in-house R&D efforts to fill 
their product pipeline.   
Finally, external sourcing is a more viable option when the patented invention is 
autonomous.63 Autonomous inventions, such as a spark plug, can generally be 
commercialized on their own, whereas systemic innovations, like a rotary engine, must 
be integrated with other developments.  The costs of managing integration with external 
suppliers and customers often outweigh the benefits of external sourcing. 
 
9. Technology Liquidity  
There is potential risk of patent illiquidity due to the high transaction costs of a 
licensing deal.  Specifically, there are often difficulties in locating a prospective 
purchaser, and, once a purchaser has been identified, communicating and allocating the 
risks of commercialization. 
 
62 See McGregor, supra note 5; Anderson, supra note 3. 
63 See Chesbrough & Teece, supra note 48. 
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Technology transfers are plagued by uncertainty and information asymmetry.64 
Neither party fully knows if the project can be successfully commercialized, but the seller 
does have a much better idea than the buyer.65 Rather than probing the economic 
implications of these problems, this analysis will make the assumption that these 
problems can best be ameliorated, much as they are in the venture capital industry, 
through reputation and informal networks. 
Prior works have identified several factors which correlate with reduced 
transaction costs.  Affiliation with venture capitalists is an indication of successful 
communication because of their perceived contacts with technology buyers.66 Prior 
dealings between the licensor and licensee have been taken as indicia of open 
communication and trust.67 Likewise, a history of in-licensing by the licensee can 
establish a reputation for fair dealing in an industry.68 Finally, the "name-brand" 
recognition of the inventor of assignee often signals technical strength.69 
These measures are most relevant for evaluating comparable transactions.  It is 
assumed that the assignee of rights conducting this valuation would likely be a venture 
capitalist or other individual with the necessary network to successfully market the 
technology.   
 
64 See generally Zeckhauser, Richard, The Challenges of Contracting for Technological Information, 93 
PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 12743 (1996);  
65 Arrow's disclosure paradox does not pose as significant a problem in the context of patent licenses as it 
does with other forms of intellectual property.  The relevant information in a patent has already been 
disclosed.  The only secret information which the seller may reveal would inform the quality of the 
technology.  If the quality is good, then the seller will suffer no loss if the information were to be shared to 
third parties. 
66 See Gans & Stern, supra note 48. 
67 See Anand, Bharat N. & Khanna, Tarun, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. IND. ECON. 103 
(2000). 
68 Id. 
69 See Wesley David Sine, Scott A. Shane & Dante DiGregorio, The Halo Effect and Technology 
Licensing: The Influence of Institutional Prestige on the Licensing of University Inventions, 49 MGMT. SCI.
478 (2003). 
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10. Application of a Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
This section develops an integrated analysis utilizing all of the factors discussed 
in the Paper.  The analysis begins with identifying the potential licenses which can be 
sold for a patent.  It then prices each license as a pre-litigation settlement, considering the 
royalty base and a reasonable royalty rate.  The reasonable royalty is calculated by 
comparison to similar transactions.  Next, the potential risks of the transaction with 
regard to technical and market failure are evaluated, and the risk level is used to compute 
a RAHR.  Finally, the present value of each potential royalty stream is calculated.   
Step 1: Identifying the Income Stream 
The first step is to calculate the potential income stream.  This is done by 
estimating the number of potential licensees, and estimating the license payment.  First, 
the royalty base must be identified, as discussed in Section Five.  The sales volume of the 
market must then be estimated.  Hopefully, the management of the portfolio company 
will already have much of the necessary data. 
After potential markets are identified, a royalty rate is identified in each market 
through evaluating comparable transactions using the metrics developed above: 
Factor Metric 
Litigation Risk o Prior Patent Litigation 
Patent Scope o Number of IPC Claims 
o "Originality" Measure 
Technical Quality o Technology Stage 
o Weighted Backward Citation 
Count 
o "Generality" Measure 
o Scientific Citation Percentage 
Technology Market o Technology Appropriability 
o Industry Complimentary Asset 
Distribution and Specialization 
Technology Pull o Presence of Disruptive Factors 
o Technology Autonomy  
Technology Liquidity o Association with VC 
o Prior Dealings Between Firms 
o Licensee Reputation 
o Inventor Reputation 
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After considering comparable transactions, an estimated royalty rate should be 
determined. With this in hand, the annual income from the license can easily be 





Step 2: Risk Calculation 
Next, the effect of risks must be captured.  This analysis has so far utilized a very 
qualitative measure of risk.  One potential area for growth is the use of more formalized 
risk estimation, perhaps with Monte Carlo analysis.  The key risks discussed were the risk 
of technical failure and technology market risks, including the existence of potential 
buyers, lack of demand for external technology, and potential illiquidity.  A discount 
factor can be estimated based upon a qualitative assessment of these risks. 
Razgaitis70 has computed the discount rate used in IP licensing negotiations, 
based on technical and market risk.  These values are somewhat lower than 
approximations of discount rates used by VC’s, but it is assumed that profit generation 
through out-licensing is less risky than through startup commercialization. 71 
Description k
Proven Technology with Reliable 
Customer 
15-20% 
Well-Understood Technology with 
Existing Market with Evidence of 
Demand 
20-30% 
New Application of Understood 
Technology with Existing Market 
25-30% 
Novel Technology or Unknown 
Market 
35-45% 
Unproven Novel Technology with 
Unknown Market 
50-70% 
70 Supra note 13, at 194. 
71 See John C. Ruhnka & John E. Young, Some Hypotheses About Risk in Venture Capital Investing, 6 J. 
BUS. VENTURING 115, 124 (1991). 
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Step 3:  Computation 
Finally, the value of the license can be taken as the present value of the future 
earnings. The royalty stream will be summed over the life of the patent. Patents have a 
maximum life of twenty years, and antitrust laws dictate that royalty payments stop when 
the patent expires72. Consequentially, there is no need to consider a terminal value: 
( ) += Nn nk meAnnualIncoValue 1
11. Conclusion 
This Paper has described an analysis of the value of patents held by startup firms 
by analyzing the out-licensing of startup technology to established firms.  It considers six 
factors that determine patent value.  The reflect risks of legal unenforceability, technical 
risk, and technology transaction risks.  These factors are then incorporated into an 
analysis that uses market comparables to find royalty rates, and a discounted cash flow to 
find the present value. This analysis is expected to be of value to venture capital firms in 
evaluating the use of patent-based transactions using the intellectual property of their 
portfolio companies.  Current trends in R&D and innovation suggest that such 
transactions will become more prevalent in the near future. 
 
72 Consequentially, the present value of patent royalties decreases with the age of the patent, because the 
license will expire sooner.  However, it is assumed that as a patent is developed by a startup, it becomes 
more valuable as technical risk is reduced.  Therefore, there exists the potential for timing a licensing 
transaction to optimize value. 
